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Abstract
This paper investigates the relation between the refinancing risk of corporate debt and firms’ 
decisions to issue capital expenditure forecast. Building on theories of financing frictions that 
predict a negative relation between refinancing risk and firm investment and theories of strate-gic 
voluntary disclosure where managers can withhold the unfavorable news of reduced invest-ment, 
we find that an increase in refinancing risk is associated with both lower probability of disclosing 
capital expenditure forecasts and lower frequency of capital expenditure forecasts. Cross-sectional 
tests show that firms that are more exposed to refinancing risk and are less able to mitigate 
refinancing risk are more likely to reduce capital expenditure forecasts following an increase in 
refinancing risk. Our results suggest that capital structure can influence firm information 
environment through managers’ disclosure incentives.
1 Introduction
How does debt financing affect firm disclosure? It is commonly believed that debt financing
has a limited effect. This is because debt is, by construction, less sensitive to information than
equity, which implies a lower demand for information from debtholders. More importantly, lenders
can privately communicate with borrowers. These two reasons indicate a muted lender demand for
public disclosure from borrowers. However, recent studies suggest that although lenders’ demand
for information itself may not affect firm’s information environments, lenders’ economic activities
may do so. For example, Kim et al. (2018) show that a decrease in lenders’ monitoring increases
shareholders’ demand for information and borrowers’ disclosures. Adding to these recent studies, we
examine corporate disclosure incentives when firms seek debt refinancing. Specifically, we predict
and demonstrate that firms facing high refinancing risk reduce their disclosures to mask bad news
regarding corporate investment from shareholders.
Firms face refinancing risk when seeking debt refinancing. Refinancing risk is the risk of failure
to refinance the principal repayment that becomes due.1 Materialization of refinancing risk means
that firms need to repay the principal, which is typically a large amount relative to interest pay-
ments. Studies show that losing a large amount of cash can prevent management from pursuing
investment opportunities (Rauh, 2006; Almeida et al., 2012), which shareholders interpret as bad
news (Lummer and McConnell, 1989). Because management has incentives to withhold bad news
from shareholders (e.g., Houston et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2011), we hypothesize that management
decreases disclosures during periods of high refinancing risk. Unlike prior studies that mainly focus
on earnings forecasts, we predict that refinancing risk is associated with fewer disclosures of capital
expenditure forecasts because refinancing risk directly affects whether investment opportunities are
pursued.
Our prediction assumes that management who has bad news about investment can withhold
it from shareholders. Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) independently show that if nondis-
closure is interpreted by investors as the worst news, management will disclose all news. Such
unraveling does not occur, that is, shareholders do not interpret nondisclosure as the worst news
for several reasons. First, higher refinancing risk, by its definition, is associated with heightened
1Prior literature also refers to this risk as liquidity risk (Diamond, 1991) and rollover risk (He and Xiong, 2012).
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uncertainty about the likelihood of refinancing. Non-disclosure can occur because management
has no information about the refinancing outcome instead of management having the worst news.
Second, management may choose not to disclose capital expenditure forecasts because no invest-
ment plans have been made. This possibility reflects the fact that capital expenditures can be
irregular. Finally, interpreting nondisclosure is not as straightforward as interpreting disclosures,
which requires that investors understand management’s strategic disclosure incentives and infer
the private information based on the action of nondisclosure. Studies demonstrate that economic
agents do not exhibit such strategic thinking and therefore do not fully react to the implications
of nondisclosures. Nondisclosure is also less salient than disclosures, which reduces the likelihood
of investors paying attention to nondisclosure and reacting to its implication. The combination of
these forces suggests that shareholders do not interpret nondisclosure as the worst news.
Firms that seek refinancing have incentives to signal firm quality. An alternative hypothesis is
therefore that firms increase capital expenditure forecasts when refinancing risk is high. Frankel
et al. (1995) show that firms that seek external capital tend to increase disclosures. Lang and
Lundholm (2000) find that firms alter their information environment in the period prior to equity
issuance. Although firms in our sample tend to seek financing from banks, which can privately
communicate with firms, the possibility remains that firms can use public disclosures to increase
the credibility of its private communication with lenders.
We measure firms’ exposure to refinancing risk using the percentage of long-term debt due for
repayment in the next year, which follows the literature of corporate debt maturity structure and
refinancing risk (e.g., Barclay and Smith, 1995; Harford et al., 2014). The idea is that a higher
percentage of long term debt due in the next year implies a larger amount of financing needed to
be raised, and by extension, a higher refinancing risk.2
Our sample starts with firms that can be matched to the I/B/E/S Guidance data and therefore
issue at least one management forecast within the sample period of 2003-2016. We keep firm-years
2We follow Harford et al. (2014) and do not use short term debt because short term debt such as working capital
and accounts payable is mainly used to finance short term operations as opposed to investment opportunities and
hence is not the focus of this paper. This approach is similar to the one taken by Almeida et al. (2012) and Gopalan
et al. (2014) and is predicated on the basis that long-term debt due within the next year is based on debt maturity
decisions made by the firm several years prior, which is unlikely to be correlated with investment opportunities in
the next year. Using short-term debt raises another concern that changes in firm credit quality and short-term debt
are correlated, as predicted by Diamond (1991). Because underlying changes in firm credit quality affect the use of
short-term debt as well as firms’ disclosure decisions, examining short-term debt precludes us from studying how the
presence of debt itself affects disclosure incentives.
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that have total debt larger than 10% of total assets, because a firm with extremely low leverage is
unlikely to be affected by refinancing risk and hence is not the focus of this study. To ensure that
capital expenditure is an important aspect of firm information environment, we exclude firms in
service industries, for which capital expenditure is not the main driver of their business model. We
also exclude financial service and utility industries following prior studies.
We find that firms with higher refinancing risk have lower likelihood and frequency of capital
expenditure forecasts. Other things equal, an inter-quartile increase in refinancing risk is associated
with 2.25 percentage points lower likelihood of issuing capital expenditure forecasts in a year, and
a decline in the number of capital expenditure forecasts by 1.2. The finding is consistent with
management withholding news about the negative consequence of refinancing risk on corporate
investment. The finding is inconsistent with the competing hypothesis that firms increase public
disclosure to mitigate refinancing risk.
We conduct two validation tests to ensure that our main empirical findings are consistent with
management withholding bad news about investment. First, our measure, the percentage of long-
term debt due within the next year, captures refinancing risk. In theory, higher refinancing risk is
associated a higher likelihood of failure to obtain financing. Periods of refinancing risk should be
associated with less investment. The empirical evidence is consistent with this prediction. Second,
because we hypothesis that management reduces disclosures to hide bad news when refinancing risk
is high, a non-disclosure of capital expenditure forecasts is on average associated with worse news
than disclosures. Directly measuring bad news about investment using the level of investment is
difficult. We instead show that when refinancing risk is high, nondisclosure of capital expenditure
forecasts is associated with worse market reaction than disclosures of capital expenditure forecasts.
The finding is consistent with management choosing to disclose more favorable news and withhold
worse news.
To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we control for factors that prior studies show to affect firms’
maturity choices because these factors are correlated with the percentage of long-term debt due in
the next year, our measure of refinancing risk. For example, a larger amount of debt due in the next
year might indicate either deleveraging efforts by firms with sufficiently good performance or failure
of refinancing in the current year. Both could affect disclosure decisions. We also include general
controls for factors that affect disclosure decisions. After controlling for firm and year fixed effects
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and the control variables mentioned above, variation in the amount of debt due in the following
year is mainly driven by firms’ financing decisions made several years in the past, which makes it
less likely to directly affect disclosure decisions of the following year.
To further demonstrate that our findings are driven by refinancing risk, we explore cross-
sectional variation in firms’ exposure to refinancing risk and their capability of mitigating refinanc-
ing risk. First, if refinancing risk drives our results, firms with a higher exposure to refinancing
risk should be more likely to reduce the disclosure of capital expenditure forecasts because, accord-
ing to our prediction, these firms are more likely to fail to obtain financing and have bad news
about their investments. We measure firms’ exposure to refinancing risk with three proxies: the
level of firm leverage, ex-ante uncertainty, and credit rating. Studies find that higher leverage is
negatively associated with firm growth, suggesting that higher leverage reduces lenders’ willingness
to supply credit (e.g., Lang et al., 1996). Similarly, higher uncertainty and a lower credit rating
also reduce lenders’ willingness to supply credits, which subject borrowers to higher refinancing
risk (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). We find that other things equal, an inter-quartile increase in
refinancing risk for firms with higher exposures to refinancing risk is associated with 1.4, 1.7, and
1.4 fewer capital expenditure forecasts than firms with lower exposures to refinancing risk, when
exposures to refinancing risk are measured with ex-ante uncertainty, speculative grade ratings, and
high leverage, respectively.
Second, we expect that firms that have less capability of mitigating refinancing risk are more
likely to reduce the disclosure of capital expenditure forecasts. We follow Harford et al. (2014)
and measure firms’ capability of mitigating refinancing risk with cash holdings. The idea is that
firms with higher cash holdings can mitigate refinancing risk by using internal cash to finance
their projects. Similarly, we expect that firms with higher profitability can use proceeds from their
existing projects to satisfy their need for additional investment. We find that the relation between
refinancing risk and capital expenditure forecasts is mitigated for firms with higher cash holdings
and higher profitability. In our sample, firms with lower profitability reduce the number of capital
expenditure forecasts by 2, all else equal, for an inter-quartile increase in refinancing risk compared
to 1 during periods of high profitability. Similarly, firms with higher cash holdings reduce the
number of capital expenditure forecasts by .8 compared to a reduction of 1.85 during periods of
low cash holdings.
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An alternative mechanism that explains our findings is lender monitoring. Gul and Good-
win (2010) document that short term debt is associated with increased monitoring. Kim et al.
(2018) show that reduced lender monitoring due to CDS trading increases shareholders’ demand
for information. Combining the findings of these two studies predicts a negative relation between
refinancing risk (higher monitoring) and capital expenditure forecasts.
We test the monitoring mechanism in two ways. First, we rely on the findings of Kim et al.
(2018) that lender monitoring is a substitute for shareholder monitoring, which predicts a reduction
in all voluntary disclosure, not simply capital expenditure forecasts. We do not find a negative
association in earnings forecasts, suggesting that lender monitoring is not the primary economic
forces at play during periods of refinancing risk. The likely reason is that although bad news
regarding investment may also mean bad news regarding future earnings, it is unclear at what
point in the future the bad news would map into earnings. The timing of this would be a function
of the horizon of the investment itself. As a result, the materialization of refinancing risk affects
current-year earnings less than investment, and by extension, earnings forecasts less than capital
expenditure forecasts. Second, if lender monitoring explains our effect, we expect our results to
vary based on the level of shareholder monitoring, measured with the percentage of institutional
ownership. We do not find that our results depend on shareholder monitoring. Therefore, lender
monitoring does not seem to explain the effect of refinancing risk.
Our paper adds to the growing literature that examines the disclosure incentives in debt mar-
kets. Prior studies examine the effect of information environment on debt financing (e.g., Sengupta,
1998). We examine the reverse and show that refinancing risk can affect firm information environ-
ment. Although lenders may not themselves demand public disclosures because they can privately
communicate with firms, recent studies show that debt financing affects public disclosures through
lenders’ interactions with borrowers or borrowers signalling their type. For example, Lo (2014)
finds that U.S. borrowers from banks with high exposure to the emerging markets crisis increased
their propensity to issue management forecasts compared to other borrowers. He attributes this
increase to borrowers mitigating future switching costs in the event the borrower must seek other
sources of financing. Vashishtha (2014) finds that management forecast issuance declines following
the transfer of control rights to the lender upon a covenant violation. Chen and Vashishtha (2017)
find that firms disclosure more following bank mergers because mergers increase bank size and
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large banks rely more on hard information to monitor borrowers. Kim et al. (2018) document that
reduced lender monitoring due to the CDS trading increases shareholders’ demand for information,
which in turn increases disclosures. We add to the literature by showing that refinancing risk can
affect the disclosure of capital expenditure forecasts through its effects on firm investment and
managers’ incentive to withhold bad news about investments.
Our paper also contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature by examining capital ex-
penditure forecasts. Capital expenditure forecasts are economically important but are not well-
understood. Although a large number of studies examine management forecasts and in particular
earnings related forecasts, studies that examine other forms of voluntary disclosure remain limited
(Hirst et al., 2008; Beyer et al., 2010). Han and Wild (1991) examine market reactions to both
revenue and earnings forecasts. Hutton et al. (2003) examine firms’ decision to supplement man-
agement forecasts with additional explanatory languages to add credibility. Wasley and Wu (2006)
examine firms’ decision to issue cash flow forecasts and argue that these forecasts are used as a
signaling device for better performance as well as a commitment device for lower levels of earnings
management. Among studies that examine capital expenditure forecasts, Lu and Tucker (2012)
find that some firms provide more capital expenditure forecasts in response to earnings decline,
suggesting a substitution role between earnings and capital expenditure forecasts. Bae et al. (2017)
show that managers learn from analyst feedback when providing capital expenditure forecasts,
which enhances capital investment efficiency. Ali et al. (2018) find that capital expenditure fore-
casts can mitigate the agency conflicts between lenders and borrowers because the forecasts have
commitment value. We differ from these studies by examining refinancing risk as a potential driver
of capital expenditure forecasts. Our finding that refinancing risk affects the disclosure of capital
expenditure forecasts adds to the literature on other forms of forecasts. We show that refinancing
risk explains capital expenditure forecast decisions but not earnings forecast decisions. The result
suggests that the same factor that affects one type of disclosure need not drive another type.
We finally contribute to the literature on refinancing risk. Many studies posit the role of
refinancing risk in influencing firm decisions. Diamond (1991) posit that refinancing risk plays a
central role in shaping firms’ debt maturity decision. Morris and Shin (2009) show that refinancing
risk increases the probability of a run on the firm, and He and Xiong (2012) find that refinancing
risk increases conflict of interest between creditors and shareholders. Furthermore, Harford et al.
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(2014) find that firms increase their cash holdings in order to mitigate refinancing risk. We find
that refinancing risk can also affect firm information environment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section (2), we develop my hypotheses;
in Section (3), we discuss data sources, the sample selection, and construction of key variables. In
Section (4), we outline our research design; in Section (5), we present descriptive statistics and
empirical findings. We conclude in Section (6).
2 Hypothesis Development
Our main prediction is that firms facing heightened refinancing risk reduce their disclosures of
capital expenditure forecasts. The prediction follows two steps. First, refinancing risk increases the
likelihood of bad news about firm investments. Following Harford et al. (2014), we define refinancing
risk as the risk that firms cannot obtain external financing to repay the principal that becomes
due, or obtain financing with unfavorable terms. Refinancing risk arises because of capital market
frictions. Specifically, lenders can refuse to provide credit due to asymmetric information (Stiglitz
and Weiss, 1981) or borrowers’ moral hazard problems which require ex-post costly monitoring
(Williamson, 1987). Even when refinancing occurs, the terms of refinancing can be adverse for
borrowers. For example, lenders can charge a higher interest rate (e.g., Froot et al., 1993). In
the event that refinancing risk materializes, a capital constrained firm is forced to forgo valuable
investment opportunities (Rauh, 2006), which shareholders interpret as bad news (Lummer and
McConnell, 1989).
Second, managers have incentives to withhold bad news about investment. Theories of dis-
cretionary disclosures show that managers can strategically withhold bad news in the presence of
disclosure frictions (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1985; Jung and Kwon, 1988). Empirical studies
support this prediction by showing managers are more likely to reduce the disclosures of earnings
forecasts when news about firm performance is bad (e.g., Chen et al., 2011; Houston et al., 2010).
We extend the logic of strategic bad news withholding to the decision to disclose capital expendi-
ture forecasts. We argue that management has incentives to withhold bad news about investment
that arises from refinancing risk, for fear that disclosing the information leads to negative capital
market consequence. We summarize the prediction as follows.
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H1: Refinancing risk is negatively associated with the likelihood and frequency of capital expen-
diture forecasts.
Note that in H1, shareholders might perfectly observe changes in refinancing risk. But without
managers’ disclosures about investments, they remain uncertain about how management responds
to refinancing risk, whether firms successfully obtain refinancing and, if so, whether the financing
proceeds are used to invest.
Besides the information asymmetry between investors and managers, withholding news is pos-
sible for several frictions related to the nature of capital expenditure forecasts. First, capital
expenditures can be proprietary.3 For example, firms might withhold information about invest-
ment because a disclosure informs competitors about their future production plans. Investors
cannot differentiate whether withholding is because of proprietary cost or bad news about invest-
ment. Second, the period of refinancing risk is associated with heightened uncertainty about the
likelihood of obtaining financing and the terms of financing, which in turn increases uncertainty
about future investment. This uncertainty allows firms that fail to obtain financing to pool with
firms that haven’t yet obtained financing, which in turn makes withholding news possible. Finally,
interpreting nondisclosure is not as straightforward as interpreting disclosures. Interpreting nondis-
closure requires that investors understand management’s strategic disclosure incentives and infer
the private information based on the action of nondisclosure. Economic agents do not exhibit such
strategic thinking and therefore do not fully react to the implications of nondisclosures. Investors
are less likely to paying attention to nondisclosure and reacting to its implication because nondis-
closure is less salient. The combination of these forces suggests that shareholders do not interpret
nondisclosure as the worst news.
Although our prediction applies to both the likelihood and frequency of capital expenditure
forecasts in theory, stopping providing forecasts can be more difficult than reducing the frequency
of capital expenditure forecasts, particularly when there is strong capital market demand for the
information. As a result, firms may not stop providing capital expenditure forecasts but simply
3Consistent with this proprietary nature, while many firms have capital expenditures, many do not issue capital
expenditure forecasts.
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reduce the frequency of these forecasts. Hence, in our empirical tests we examine both frequency
and probability of capital expenditure forecasts.
Besides the investment channel posited in H1, in theory, a relation between refinancing risk
and capital expenditure forecasts can be driven by two alternative mechanisms. First, periods
of high refinancing risk is associated with heightened lender monitoring. For example, Gul and
Goodwin (2010) find that lenders increase their scrutiny over managerial actions during periods of
credit rollover. Prior studies document that monitoring can affect corporate disclosure decisions
but provide mixed evidence on the sign of the relation. On the one hand, to the extent that
lender monitoring improves corporate governance, studies find that firms voluntarily disclose more
information (Ajinkya et al., 2005). On the other hand, Kim et al. (2018) find that firms provide
more earnings forecasts when lender monitoring decreases, proxied by CDS trading, which suggests
a negative relation between refinancing risk and disclosures.
To investigate the monitoring mechanism, we examine the effects of refinancing risk on the
provision of current-year earnings forecasts. Despite documenting different signs for the relation
between monitoring and disclosures, the consensus from prior studies is that monitoring affects the
provision of earnings forecasts. In contrast, the investment channel laid out in H1 mainly applies
to capital expenditure forecasts, and less likely to current-year earnings forecasts. Although mate-
rialization of refinancing risk has negative effects on investments, the effects manifest in earnings
with delays, which vary as a function of the investment horizon. To put it differently, current-year
earnings is also affected by investments made in the past and contracts already signed with cus-
tomers. As a result, the investment channel predicts a smaller response of earnings forecasts to
refinancing risk than that of capital expenditure forecasts. Furthermore, if management has incen-
tives to camouflage the negative effects of refinancing risk on investment, they may even increase
earnings forecasts so that investors pay less attention to the bad news from refinancing risk. We
examine the effect of refinancing risk on earnings forecasts to differentiate the monitoring channel.
In addition to examining earnings forecasts, we use cross-sectional variation in shareholder
monitoring to validate the monitoring channel. The idea is that if higher refinancing risk changes
firm disclosures through changes in monitoring, the existing level of monitoring from shareholders
should affect the changes in disclosures.
The second alternative mechanism is that firms looking to mitigate refinancing risk can look
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to public financing, which motivate them to improve the information environment. For example,
Frankel et al. (1995) show that firms increase disclosure prior to equity financing. Sengupta (1998)
finds that higher public disclosure quality is associated with lower corporate bond yield. If firms
facing refinancing risk turn to the equity or public bond market for financing, they will increase their
disclosures. We argue that the channel is unlikely to manifest in our case because firms that facing
refinancing risk continues to use debt, which allows them to private communicate with lenders.
Nevertheless, the possibility remains that firms can increase their public disclosures to increase
the credibility of their communications with lenders. An increase in disclosures is the opposite to
what H1 predicts. Because the signs of the empirical predictions differ, finding a negative relation
between refinancing risk and disclosures is inconsistent with this alternative mechanism
We further substantiate our main prediction by exploring two cross-sectional variations of refi-
nancing risk. First, we expect that, if refinancing risk drives disclosure decisions, the negative rela-
tion between refinancing risk and the disclosure of capital expenditure forecasts should strengthen
for firms with higher exposures to refinancing risk. The reason is that when firms are more exposed
to refinancing risk, an increase in refinancing risk results in a more negative effect on investments,
which reduces managers’ incentives to provide capital expenditure forecasts.
Our second set of tests examine firms that are less able to mitigate refinancing risk. The
negative effects of refinancing risk on investments of these firms are larger. According to H1, these
firms are more likely to reduce the disclosure of capital expenditure forecasts. We formalize these
cross-sectional predictions in the following hypotheses:
H2a: The relation between refinancing risk and the likelihood of capital expenditure forecasts is
stronger for firms that are more exposed to refinancing risk.
H2b: The relation between refinancing risk and the likelihood of capital expenditure forecasts is
stronger for firms that have less capability to mitigate refinancing risk.
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3 Sample Selection
We collect all management forecasts from I/B/E/S Guidance. We limit the sample between
2003, the year I/B/E/S guidance started collecting management forecast data, and 2016. We then
match management forecast data with Compustat. To measure forecast practice, we drop forecasts
that occur after their corresponding fiscal year end dates, because these are more likely to be pre-
announcement of earnings (Anilowski et al., 2007). We then assign forecasts into firm fiscal years
according to their corresponding forecast announcement dates, and create measures of both the
existence and frequency of capital expenditure forecasts. We also collect earnings related forecasts
for falsification tests. By using the merged sample between I/B/E/S Guidance and Compustat,
we effectively delete firms that never provide management forecasts. Our empirical prediction
does not apply to firms that never forecasts. That is, we do not expect refinancing risk to be the
reason why these firms never issue any management forecasts, unless these firms are in the state
of constant suffering of refinancing risk. The sample selection choice defines the population we are
interested in to be those firms that have forecasting practice and can potentially reduce forecasts
when experiencing heightened refinancing risk.
Following prior studies, we then drop firms from finance and utility industries (two-digit SIC
codes of 49 or 60-67). We also drop firms from the service industries. The capital expenditure of
these firms is not the primary driver of their business model. Therefore we do not expect that they
mainly use capital expenditure forecasts to convey value relevant information. Finally, we drop
firm-year observations where total leverage was less than 10 percent of total firm value. Firms with
low leverage rely less on debt and by definition do not face substantial refinancing risk. These firms
are not the focus of this study.
For our regression analysis, we require non-missing control variables. Most control variables
are obtained from Compustat. Variables that use stock price and returns are from CRSP. Number
of analyst following is from I/B/E/S Detail History. The percentage of institutional ownership is
from Thomson Reuter. The sample section procedure in the end yields a final sample of 17,188




We test our main prediction from H1 by examining the association between refinancing risk
and capital expenditure forecasts, controlling for known determinants that jointly affect these two
constructs. Our regression model is
CAPXGuideit+1 = β0 + β1RefRiskit + β2Xit + it, (1)
where CAPXGuideit+1 is the existence and frequency of capital expenditure forecasts of firm i
in year t + 1, RefRiskit is the refinancing risk of firm i at the end of year t, measured with long
term debt due in year t+ 1 as a percentage of total debt outstanding at the end of year t, and Xit
represents a vector of control variables to be discussed below.
Following prior studies, we do not use short-term debt to measure refinancing risk for two
reasons. First, as argued by Harford et al. (2014), the amount of long-term debt due better captures
the risk of financing firms’ long-term investment. In contrast, short-term debt is generally issued
to finance short-term assets for day-to-day operations instead of long-term investment. It is paid
down within the year and is usually not refinanced. Second, as shown by Diamond (1991), firms
of both low and high credit quality choose short-term debts. The relation between firms’ credit
quality and the usage of short-term debts aggravates the endogeneity problem because shocks to
firms’ credit quality are also likely to be related to their disclosure decisions.
In contrast with using short-term debt, using the amount of long-term debt due in the next year
has identification benefits. By definition, the amount of long-term debt is determined several years
ago. Conditional on determinants of current-year maturity choices and firm and year fixed effects,
variation in the percentage of long-term debt due in the next year is less likely to be correlated
with firms’ current economic conditions, which makes the measure less endogenous to disclosure
decisions of the next year than short-term debt.
Despite our argument for the measure’s identification benefit, the endogeneity concern remains
that the measure is not randomly assigned. In particular, anticipating a higher amount of debt in
the next year, firms may change their financing decisions in the current year. For example, a larger
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percentage of debt due in the next year might reflect firms’ decision to change maturity (Barclay
and Smith, 1995) or dynamically adjust maturity (Xu, 2017). This could in turn affect disclosure
decisions in the next year. To alleviate the concern that refinancing risk is endogeneous to firms’
maturity choice and disclosure decisions, we control for factors that affect both the percentage
of long-term debt due in the following year, our measure of refinancing risk, and firms’ decisions
to issue capital expenditure forecasts. Among variables that affect disclosure decisions, we only
include variables that we expect to be correlated with firms’ decisions to issue capital expenditure
forecasts. We also include firm and year fixed effects to control for across-firm and across-year
heterogeneity.
Our choice of control variables relies on the large literature on firms’ debt maturity and disclosure
decisions. When describing the control variables below, we also discuss the literature on firms’
maturity choice to ensure that we include control variables that are relevant to our purpose.
1. Leverage
Leverage is an important determinant of firm maturity. Billett et al. (2007) find a strong
positive relation between leverage and maturity other things equal. The relation between
leverage and firm capital expenditure forecasts is less clear. Lu and Tucker (2012) do not
include it as the determinant. Guay et al. (2016) include leverage as a control when exam-
ining firms’ decision to issue management forecasts. Leverage loads positively in fixed effects
specification while negative in the specification without fixed effects. There is also no clear
theoretical prediction relating leverage and disclosure except that leverage may be associated
with firm growth opportunity (Barclay and Smith, 1995).
2. Book-to-market ratio (BTM).
We use book-to-market ratio to capture firms’ investment opportunities in year t. Barclay
and Smith (1995) find that firms with more investment opportunities, that is, lower book-to-
market ratio, are less likely to use long-term debt. Billett et al. (2007) find similar results
by simultaneously examining leverage, maturity, and covenant. In the disclosure literature,
book-to-market ratio is often used to capture proprietary costs, since firms with higher growth
opportunities are more likely to have proprietary information. Ajinkya et al. (2005) find no
relation between proprietary costs, proxied by market-to-book ratio, and a firms forecast
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decisions. Ajinkya et al. (2005) examine earnings forecasts, which may have lower levels of
proprietary costs than capital expenditure forecasts. In addition, firms with higher growth
opportunity have higher external financing needs, which increases the incentive to disclose.
For example, Frankel et al. (1995) find that firms that seek external financing are more likely
to increase disclosure.
3. Firm size.
We use log market value of equity at the end of year t to capture firm size. Size has been
an important control variable for almost all disclosure studies, which is used to proxy for
general demand for information and firm visibility. Size is also an important determinant
of firm maturity structure, as shown by Barclay and Smith (1995) and Billett et al. (2007).
Furthermore, prior literature has found that size, which is inversely related to information
asymmetry, is likely to have shorter-term debt in the form of bank loans and hence may be
more subject to refinancing risk; firms with a high information asymmetry are also more likely
to benefit from improving the information environment to mitigate information uncertainty.
4. Firm performance.
Firm performance is used to capture the observed firm credit quality. Theories on maturity
structure provide mixed predictions on the relation between firm credit quality and maturity
structure (e.g., Diamond, 1991, 1993; Rajan, 1992). Empirical research typically finds a
positive relation between maturity and firm performance. Firm performance is positively
associated with the likelihood of issuing management forecasts (e.g., Houston et al., 2010;
Chen et al., 2011). However, the relation between performance and capital expenditure
forecasts is less clear because firms may have incentive to use capital expenditure forecasts
to mitigate the negative impact of earnings forecasts that convey bad news. Lu and Tucker
(2012) do not find a significant relation between firm performance and the likelihood of issuing
capital expenditure forecasts. Their sample is only based on a single year (2005), so power
might be an issue. Following Chen et al. (2011), we use capture firm performance using annual
stock return adjusted by market return. We also include return on assets to be consistent with
the maturity structure literature. Following Houston et al. (2010), we also add an indicator
for loss in year t.
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5. Return volatility.
We use return volatility to capture uncertainty about firms’ future cash flow. Although
Barclay and Smith (1995) do not include it as a determinant of maturity structure, Billett
et al. (2007) find a positive relation between cash flow volatility and maturity. To create
a measure that is less dependent on firm time series, we follow the disclosure literature and
control for firm daily return volatility in year t, which captures firms’ information environment
(Nagar et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2011).
6. The percentage of institutional ownership and the number of analyst following.
There is no direct relation between institutional ownership and maturity structure. The
percentage of institutional ownership is often used as a control variable for management
forecasts (e.g. Healy et al., 1999; Bushee and Noe, 2000; Ajinkya et al., 2005). In the same
spirit, we also control for the natural logarithm of analyst following.
7. Long term debt issuance.
Xu (2017) shows that firms dynamically adjust their maturity structure after issuance. We
use the amount of long-term debt issuance in year t scaled by the total debt in year t− 1 to
capture the extent to which firms adjust maturity. To the extent that our existing control
variables (including firm fixed effects) do not capture all factors that determine firms’ maturity
structure, the amount of long-term debt issuance should capture the additional unobserved
factors.
Throughout all our analyses, we cluster standard errors by firm. In addition, we estimate OLS
regressions using the decile ranks of the independent variables scaled from 0 to 1. Similar to Guay
et al. (2016), doing so allows for a meaningful comparison of the economic significance between the
independent variables. Hence, the coefficient of our variable of interest, the interaction, measures
how voluntary disclosure of capital expenditure forecasts changes when moving from the bottom
to top decile of refinancing risk.
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4.2 Cross-sectional tests
We test our cross-sectional predictions by modifying equation (1) to include the interaction
term between RefRiskit and cross-sectional indicators:
CAPXGuideit+1 = β0 + β1RefRiskit + β2RefRiskitXCSit + β3CSit + β2Xit + it, (2)
where all variables are defined as before and CSit is the cross-sectional indicators.
The coefficient of interest is β2, which captures the differential effect of refinancing risk when
the cross-sectional variable takes one. From H2 in section 2, the negative association between
refinancing risk and capital expenditure forecasts is stronger when firms are more exposed to
refinancing risk and firms’ capability to mitigate refinancing risk is low.
We measure firms’ exposures to refinancing risk with three proxies. The first proxy is firm
leverage. Highly levered firms are more exposed to refinancing risk, because firms with higher
leverage need to refinance a larger amount of debt for the same percentage of debt due in the
next year, and refinancing a large amount of debt is presumably more difficult, other things equal.
Furthermore, firms with a higher level of leverage have higher credit risk and may face higher
credit rationing from lenders. Consistent with the negative consequence of high leverage, Opler and
Titman (1994) find that firms with a higher leverage lose substantial market share to competitors
during industry downturns. We define a firm-year observation to have high leverage if leverage
is larger than the 75th percentile of its full-sample distribution. The second proxy is the level of
ex-ante uncertainty. Lenders are more likely to ration credits when information asymmetry is high
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). We expect that higher ex-ante uncertainty increases firms’ exposure to
refinancing risk. We define a firm-year to have high ex-ante uncertainty if return volatility is larger
than its cross-sectional median. The third proxy is credit quality. For the same amount of debt
due in the next year, lenders are more likely to ration credit if the credit quality of the borrower is
low. We define low credit quality if a firm’s credit rating is speculative grade.
We measure firms’ capability of mitigating refinancing risk with two proxies. First, firms with
a higher portion of cash holdings relative to total debt face less refinancing risk to finance their
investments as they are able to do so internally. Consistent with this idea, Harford et al. (2014)
conclude that firms build up cash reserves in order to mitigate refinancing risk. We define a firm-
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year to have high cash-holdings if cash-holdings are larger than the 25th percentile of its full-sample
distribution. As a second proxy, we argue that firms that have performed well in the prior year
face less refinancing risk as better performance indicates lower default risk and higher ability to
service debt payments. We define a firm-year to have better performance if its ROA is higher than
its full-sample median.
Our proxies for the exposure to refinancing risk and firms’ ability to mitigate refinancing risk
are not mutually exclusive. For example, a firm with high leverage presumably also has difficulty
mitigating refinancing risk. The purpose of the cross-sectional tests is not to pin down the mech-
anism. Rather, they serve to validate our main hypothesis that refinancing risk is associated with
reduced incentive to disclose. We expect a stronger effect of refinancing risk in both cases, that is,




We start by describing the variables for our main analysis. The sample that corresponds to our
firm fixed effect specification consists of 17,188 observations from 2003 to 2016. In this sample, the
likelihood of providing at least one capital expenditure forecast is 51%, and the average number of
capital expenditure forecasts is 1.63 per year (the measure takes zero for firm-year observations with
no capital expenditure forecasts). The likelihood of providing at least one earnings forecast is 49%,
and the average number of earnings forecasts is 3.53. Despite the similarity in the unconditional
likelihood of issuing a capital expenditure forecast and an earnings forecast, the number of earnings
forecasts in a year is higher than that of capital expenditure forecasts because earnings forecasts
can be either quarterly or annual whereas capital expenditure forecasts are mainly annual. Overall,
the descriptive statistics suggest that capital expenditure forecasts represent non-trivial portion of
firms’ total forecasting activity.
[Insert Table 1]
The average amount of long-term debt due within the next year as a percentage of total debt
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is 8.7% with standard deviation 16.1%, which suggests a large amount of cross-sectional variation.
The distribution of refinancing risk is skewed. The median firm-year observation only has 2.5% of
total debt due in the next year. These firms presumably have very low refinancing risk. The 75th
percentile firm-year observation has 10% of total debt due in the next year. We also notice large
cross-sectional variations in the control variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%
and 99% to mitigate outlier concerns.
We next examine the relation between refinancing risk and other variables in our sample. To
present the relation between capital expenditure forecasts and refinancing risk, we plot in Figure 1
the relation between refinancing risk and the frequency of capital expenditure forecasts. We first
sort refinancing risk into deciles, which are presented in the horizontal axis, and then compute the
average number of capital expenditure forecasts across firm-year observations for each decile, which
is presented in the vertical axis.
Figure 1 provides descriptive evidence consistent with H1 that higher refinancing risk is asso-
ciated with fewer disclosures of capital expenditure forecasts. When refinancing risk is low (below
median), the relation between refinancing risk and the frequency of capital expenditure forecasts
is almost flat. This pattern echoes the distribution of refinancing risk shown in Table 1. Because
the median firm is presumably not subject to refinancing risk (the amount of debt due next year as
a percentage of total debt for the median firm is only 2.5%), we do not expect a relation between
refinancing risk and disclosures when refinancing risk is below the median. As refinancing risk
increases, the frequency of capital expenditure forecasts starts to decline.
[Insert Figure 1]
Table 2 describes the relation between refinancing risk, sorted into deciles, and the mean of the
control variables. Because many firms have almost zero percentage of debt due in the next year, the
first two deciles are combined into a single group. Larger firms tend to have lower refinancing risk.
Firm performance and refinancing risk exhibit weak nonlinear relations. Firm-year observations
that have worse ROA and lower stock returns and suffer from loss tend to belong to the the
first two deciles and the top decile of refinancing risk. The relation between return volatility and
refinancing risk is almost flat for the first nine deciles of refinancing risk. Firm-year observations
belonging to the top decile of refinancing risk have higher return volatility. In terms of leverage,
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firms with higher refinancing risk tend to have higher leverage. This relation exists despite that
we scale the long-term debt due in the next year with total debt when computing refinancing risk,
which mechanically introduces a negative relation between leverage and refinancing risk. Higher
refinancing risk is associated with lower institutional ownership and analyst following. Finally,
higher refinancing risk is associated with lower debt issued in the next year, consistent with the
negative effect of refinancing risk on obtaining financing.
[Insert Table 2]
Because capital expenditure forecasts are likely to be driven by industry-level investment prac-
tices, we next examine the distribution of the number of capital expenditure forecasts and earnings
forecasts for each one-digit SIC industry in our sample. The results are presented in Table 3.
Table 3 shows that firms’ capital expenditure forecasts and earnings forecasts do not exhibit
the same across-industry variation. Firms in mining and construction industries (SIC=1) on aver-
age issue more capital expenditure forecasts (2.5 per firm-year) and fewer earnings forecasts (1.4
per firm-year) than other industries. Agricultural and public administration industries (SIC=0
and SIC=9) have the opposite patterns. Firms in these two industries issue 0.8 and 0.4 capital
expenditure forecasts per firm-year, which is less frequent than firms in the other industries. Firms
in these two industries respectively issue 4.9 and 4.5 earnings forecasts, more frequently than firms
in the other industries. The distinctions between earnings forecasts and capital expenditure fore-
casts suggest that the same factors that drive earnings forecast decisions may not affect capital
expenditure forecast decisions.
Table 3 also demonstrates that Industries differ in their refinancing risk. Firms in mining and
construction industries have lower refinancing risk relative to those in public administrations. The
results suggest that a relation between refinancing risk and capital expenditure forecasts might
be driven by across-industry heterogeneity. We therefore control for industry-fixed effects in our
empirical specifications. In most of the empirical specifications, we control firm fixed effects, which




This section examines the relation between refinancing risk and the disclosure of capital ex-
penditure forecasts. Our main prediction is that firms facing higher refinancing risk reduce the
disclosure of capital expenditure forecasts. We examine both the existence and frequency of capital
expenditure forecasts.
[Insert Table 4]
Table 4 presents our main results. Column (1) and (2) report our main specification in (1)
using the existence of capital expenditure forecasts as the dependent variable. Column (1) controls
for two-digit SIC industry fixed effects. Column (2) controls for firm fixed effects. Column (3)
and (4) report our main specification of (1) using the number of capital expenditure forecasts as
our dependent variable. Column (3) controls for two-digit SIC industry fixed effects. Column (4)
controls for firm fixed effects. All columns include control variables.
We find that higher refinancing risk is associated with lower likelihood of disclosing capital
expenditure forecasts. We find similar results using the frequency of capital expenditure forecasts
as the dependent variable. Using the coefficient estimate from Column (2), other things equal, an
inter-quartile increase in refinancing risk is associated with a 2.25% decrease in the probability of
issuing capital expenditure forecasts in the next year. Using the coefficient estimate from Column
(4), an inter-quartile increase in refinancing risk is associated with a decrease in the number of
capital expenditure forecasts by 1.2.
Turning into the effects of the control variables, we find that firms with lower growth opportu-
nities, that is, higher book-to-market ratio, are more likely to issue capital expenditure forecasts,
consistent with lower proprietary cost for firms with lower growth opportunities. Similar to Guay
et al. (2016) who examine the total number of management forecasts, we find no relation between
return volatility and the likelihood and number of capital expenditure forecasts when not control-
ling for firm fixed effects, but a positive relation when controlling for firm fixed effects. To the
extent that return volatility captures information asymmetry in the stock market, the results are
consistent with firms having stronger incentive to disclose when the level of information asym-
metry increases. Leverage is positively related to the issuance of capital expenditure forecasts.
This confirms results from prior studies that firm investment and leverage are related (Lang et al.,
20
1996). Similar to the literature on earnings forecasts, both analyst following and percentage of
institutional ownership are positively related to the likelihood and number of capital expenditure
forecasts (Ajinkya et al., 2005).
We do not find a significant relation between other control variables and the likelihood or
number of capital expenditure forecasts. In particular, changes in the amount of long-term debt
issuance are not significantly related to capital expenditure forecasts. The result suggest maturity
management, which is associated with changes in long-term debt, does not drive the decision to
issue capital expenditure forecasts. Interestingly, firm performance, measured by earnings (ROA),
does not seem to be related to firms’ decisions to issue capital expenditure forecasts. This result is
consistent with the evidence provided by Lu and Tucker (2012) who also document an insignificant
relation between firm performance and capital expenditure forecasts for their main sample. Park
et al. (2018) who examines whether firms disclose information to attract investors’ attention also
find similar results. The result suggests that capital expenditure forecasts are issued to inform
investors of firms’ future investment, which are long-run focused and are less likely to be affected
by short-run performance. This result provides preliminary evidence that our results are less likely
to hold for current-year earnings forecasts, which are related to short-run performance.
Overall, the results from Table 4 confirm H1 that higher refinancing risk is associated with fewer
disclosures of capital expenditure forecasts. Because we include firm fixed effects, the effects are not
driven by time invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity. Our control variables capture determinants
of maturity choices based on findings from prior studies. In particular, maturity management does
not seem to drive our results. The results are consistent with management hiding bad news about
investment from shareholders when refinancing risk is high. As discussed in section 2, finding a
negative relation between refinancing risk and is inconsistent with the alternative mechanism that
firms facing higher refinancing risk increase disclosure to gain access to the public bond or equity
market or to increase the credibility of their communications with lenders (e.g., Frankel et al.,
1995; Sengupta, 1998). We caution that our findings do not dispute studies that document that
firms increase disclosures when seeking public financing. Our evidence implies that our measure of
refinancing risk mainly captures private debt refinancing presumably with banks, an interpretation
that is shared by prior studies (e.g., Harford et al., 2014).
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5.2.1 Alternative explanations
An alternative explanation for the results in Table 4 was that lenders increase monitoring
in periods of credit rollover, which in turn changes firms’ disclosure incentives. As discussed in
section 2, in contrast with H1 that mainly applies to capital expenditure forecasts, the monitoring
mechanism applies to both capital expenditure forecasts and earnings forecasts. We repeat the
specification in equation (1) but replace the dependent variable with current year earnings forecasts.
Table 5 present the regression results. We do not find statistical evidence that indicates a
lower likelihood of earnings forecasts when refinancing risk increases. The coefficient estimates are
neither statistically nor economically significant. An inter-quartile increase in refinancing risk is
associated with 0.23% lower likelihood of issuing an earnings forecast and with 0.003 fewer earnings
forecasts. Recall that the effects on the likelihood and number capital expenditure forecasts are
respectively 2.25% and 1.2, which are an order of magnitude larger. If lender monitoring were to
play a major role, we would have seen a decline in earnings forecasts. The result suggests that an
increase in lender monitoring during periods of credit rollover does not drive the decrease in capital
expenditure forecasts.
[Insert Table 5]
The analysis in Table 5 assumes that management can reduce earnings forecasts in the same
magnitude as they do for capital expenditure forecasts. Empirically, it is possible that the pro-
vision of earnings forecast is stickier than that of capital expenditure forecast, so it is harder to
management to stop providing earnings forecasts. Untabulated analysis suggests that, if anything,
capital expenditure forecasts are stickier than earnings forecasts. We regress the provision of a cap-
ital expenditure forecast on whether there was a capital expenditure forecast in the previous year,
controlling for firm and year fixed effects. The regression coefficient is 0.47. Similarly, we regress
the provision of an earnings forecast on whether there was an earning forecast in the previous year,
controlling for firm and year fixed effects. The regression coefficient is 0.30. The same regressions
controlling for only year fixed effects produce slope coefficients of 0.78 for capital expenditure fore-
casts and 0.77 for earnings forecasts. Overall, there is no evidence that it is harder not to provide
earnings forecasts than not to provide capital expenditure forecasts.
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Another prediction from the monitoring mechanism is that the effect of lender monitoring on
firm disclosures should vary with the existing level of shareholder monitoring. Lender monitoring
should have a smaller effect when existing shareholders monitor more. We test this prediction by
interacting refinancing risk with the level of institutional ownership. The interaction term should be
significantly different from zero if refinancing risk mainly captures lender monitoring. We report our
analysis in Table 6. Contrary to the prediction based on lender monitoring, Table 6 demonstrates
that the interaction term is not significantly different from zero.
[Insert Table 6]
5.2.2 Additional analysis
This section provides additional analyses to support our results. Our hypothesis argues that
higher refinancing risk is associated with worse news about firm investment. If this is true, a
higher level should be associated with a higher likelihood of failure to obtain financing or obtain
financing with unfavorable terms, which predicts a lower level of investment. To test this, we
regress investment, defined as total capital expenditure in year t scaled by assets in period t-1, on
refinancing risk. We report our results in Table 9. We find that firms with higher refinancing risk
have a statistically significant lower amount of capital expenditure in the following year.
[Insert Table 9]
5.3 Cross-sectional variation in refinancing risk
This section examines whether firms that are more exposed to refinancing risk and are less
able to mitigate refinancing risk are more likely to reduce capital expenditure forecasts. We first
investigate whether the negative relation between refinancing risk and disclosure is stronger for
firms that are more exposed to refinancing risk. Table 7 reports the cross-sectional results on
the proxies for exposure to refinancing risk: firm uncertainty, credit rating, and leverage. For
each cross-sectional variable, we create a dummy variable that equals one when the exposure to
refinancing risk is high.
[Insert Table 7]
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The results show that, when firms are more exposed to refinancing risk, they are more likely
to reduce the likelihood of disclosing capital expenditure forecasts and the frequency of capital
expenditure forecast disclosures. We find that other things equal, an inter-quartile increase in
refinancing risk is associated with a reduction in the number of capital expenditure forecasts by
1.4 for periods of high ex-ante uncertainty compared to periods of less ex-ante uncertainty, proxied
by volatility. In addition, an inter-quartile increase in refinancing risk is associated with a decrease
of 1.7 capital expenditure forecasts for speculative-grade firms compared to non-speculative grade
firms. similar to the prior two results, we find that an inter-quartile increase in refinancing risk is
associated with a decrease of 1.4 capital expenditure forecasts for highly levered firms compared to
less levered firms.
We next investigate whether the negative relation between refinancing risk and disclosure is
stronger for firms that are less capable of mitigating refinancing risk. Table 8 reports the cross-
sectional results on the proxies for firms’ capability of mitigating refinancing risk: firm profitability
and cash holding. For each cross-sectional variable, we create a dummy variable that equals one
when the capability of mitigating refinancing risk is high.
[Insert Table 8]
The results show that, when firms have greater capability to mitigate refinancing risk, they
are less likely to reduce the disclosure of capital expenditure forecasts and the number of capital
expenditure forecasts. In our sample, firms with lower profitability reduce capex forecasts by 2, all
else equal, for an inter-quartile increase in refinancing risk, compared to 1 during periods of high
profitability. Similarly, firms with higher cash holdings reduce capital expenditure forecasts by .8
compared to a reduction of -1.85 during periods of low cash holdings.
Overall, the cross-sectional evidence provides further support for a role of refinancing risk in
driving firm capital expenditure forecasts. Omitted factors will have explain why refinancing risk
is associated with a larger reduction in capital expenditure forecasts when firms are more exposed
to refinancing risk and less able to mitigate refinancing risk.
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5.4 Consequences
The results so far suggest that management has incentives to withhold bad news about capital
expenditures for capital market reasons. This section investigates two types of costs from reducing
capital expenditure forecasts: (1) information asymmetry, and (2) management learning from the
stock price.
6 Conclusion
A large literature examines how equity and public bond financing affects corporate information
environments and corporate voluntary disclosure decisions. In contrast, the effects of debt financing
on disclosure decisions are less understood. We examine the relation between refinancing risk
and firms’ decisions to issue capital expenditure forecasts. Refinancing risk represents periods of
heightened uncertainty about the likelihood of being able to obtain financing and the terms of
financing. Prior studies show that higher refinancing risk can reduce investment. Theories of
strategic disclosure that predict that firms have incentive to withhold bad news from investors
(Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1985; Jung and Kwon, 1988). Combining the two strands of literature, we
predict a decrease in the voluntary disclosure of capital expenditure forecasts when firms face high
refinancing risk.
Using an OLS specification to examine the relation between periods of high refinancing risk and
voluntary disclosures of capital expenditure forecasts, we find that firms with higher refinancing
risk have lower likelihood and frequency of capital expenditure forecasts. Other things equal, an
inter-quartile increase in refinancing risk is associated with 2.25% lower likelihood of issuing capital
expenditure forecasts in a year, and a decrease in the number of capital expenditure forecasts by
-1.2.
We also examine the relation between refinancing risk and voluntary disclosure of capital ex-
penditure forecasts in two sets of cross-sectional tests. If the relation between refinancing risk and
voluntary disclosure is caused by an increase in uncertainty regarding the investment ability of
firms in the future, then we expect the relation to strengthen when the firm is exposed to more re-
financing risk. To test this, we examine periods of high ex-ante uncertainty, high leverage, and low
credit rating. In addition, we expect the relation between refinancing risk and capital expenditure
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forecasts to be mitigated when the firm has greater ability to mitigate refinancing risk. To test
this, we examine the relation between refinancing risk and disclosure when firms have higher cash
holdings and high profitability. We find that the negative relation between refinancing risk and
disclosure of capital expenditure forecasts is stronger when firms are more exposed to refinancing
risk and are less able to mitigate refinancing risk. The evidence supports our prediction that higher
refinancing risk reduces the issuance of capital expenditure forecasts.
Our findings suggest that firms’ information environment is multi-faceted. While prior studies
have focused on earnings related forecasts, other types of disclosures become increasingly common.
Our paper documents that factors that drive firms’ decisions to issue other types of forecasts can
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Figure 1: Refinancing risk and capital expenditure forecasts
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. All variables are defined in
Table A1.
VARIABLES N Mean Std 25% 50% 75%
RefRisk 17188 0.087 0.161 0.001 0.025 0.103
Capex Guide 17188 0.507 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000
Earnings Guide 17188 0.485 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
Num of Capex 17188 1.630 2.066 0.000 1.000 3.000
Num of Earnings 17188 3.528 4.983 0.000 0.000 6.000
Log(Size) 17188 6.981 1.960 5.671 6.990 8.290
ROA 17188 −0.004 0.165 −0.009 0.036 0.070
BTM 17188 0.748 0.309 0.539 0.723 0.915
Adj Returns 17188 0.031 0.412 −0.249 −0.018 0.231
Volatility 17188 0.030 0.017 0.018 0.025 0.036
Leverage 17188 0.341 0.193 0.202 0.294 0.427
Inst Own 17188 0.538 0.519 0.000 0.558 0.876
Num Analysts 17188 11.921 9.759 4.000 9.000 18.000
Loss 17188 0.280 0.449 0.000 0.000 1.000
Amt Debt Issue 17188 1.265 4.276 0.000 0.226 0.825












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Disclosure and Refinancing Risk by Industry
This table presents descriptive statistics for the disclosure variables and refinancing risk for each one-digit SIC
industry. The disclosure variables include the issuance of capital expenditure forecasts (Capex Guide) and earnings
forecasts Earnings Guide and the number of capital expenditure forecasts (Num Capex) and earnings forecasts
(Num Earnings). All variables are defined in Table A1.
SIC Capex Guide Earnings Guide Num Capex Num Earnings RefRisk
0 0.343 0.522 0.776 4.910 0.085
1 0.633 0.253 2.542 1.440 0.068
2 0.503 0.508 1.530 3.888 0.089
3 0.454 0.553 1.341 4.074 0.102
4 0.500 0.362 1.699 2.137 0.085
5 0.560 0.581 1.747 4.528 0.066
9 0.200 0.517 0.417 4.617 0.122
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Table 4: Main Test - Refinancing Risk and Capital Expenditure Forecasts
This table reports the coefficients of the OLS regression of management capital expenditure forecasts on refinancing
risk in the following specification:
Capex Guideit+1 = β0 + β1RefRiskit + β2Xit + it,
In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the indicator for issuing a capital expenditure forecast in the year
t+1. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the number of capital expenditure forecasts issued in year t+1.
Column (1) and (3) uses industry fixed effects and Column (2) and (4) uses firm fixed effects. All the independent
variables are lagged by one year and decile-ranked. Refinancing Risk is calculated as the portion of long-term debt
due in year t+1, obtained from a firm’s financial statements in year t. All control variables are defined in Table A1. p
values, reported in brackets, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Within R2 is reported for fixed effect regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Capex Guide Capex Guide Num. Capex Num. Capex
RefRisk −0.144*** −0.045*** −0.531*** −0.228***
(0.019) (0.015) (0.080) (0.059)
Log(Size) 0.229*** 0.340*** 0.998*** 1.407***
(0.043) (0.046) (0.184) (0.195)
ROA 0.025 0.019 0.014 0.109
(0.029) (0.021) (0.124) (0.087)
BTM 0.084*** 0.045* 0.348*** 0.230**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.101) (0.109)
Adj Returns −0.002 0.009 0.034 0.050
(0.011) (0.009) (0.045) (0.037)
Volatility 0.008 0.041** 0.262** 0.300***
(0.025) (0.020) (0.111) (0.082)
Leverage 0.049** 0.052** 0.138 0.259***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.094) (0.083)
Inst Own 0.139*** 0.055* 0.543*** 0.272*
(0.028) (0.031) (0.123) (0.146)
Num Analysts 0.247*** 0.196*** 0.962*** 0.711***
(0.038) (0.037) (0.162) (0.152)
Loss −0.047*** 0.007 −0.217*** 0.036
(0.016) (0.012) (0.070) (0.048)
Amt Debt Issue 0.024 −0.018 0.098 −0.012
(0.016) (0.012) (0.069) (0.049)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes No Yes No
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 17,092 17,188 17,092 17,188
R2 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Refinancing Risk and Earnings Forecasts
This table reports the coefficients of the OLS regression of management earnings forecasts on refinancing risk in the
following specification:
Earnings Guideit+1 = β0 + β1RefRiskit + β2Xit + it,
In columns (1), the dependent variable is the indicator for issuing an earnings expenditure forecast with horizon
shorter than or equal to one year in the year t+1. In columns (2), the dependent variable is the number of earnings
forecasts with horizon shorter than or equal to one year issued in year t+1. Both columns include firm fixed effects.
All the independent variables are lagged by one year and decile-ranked. Refinancing Risk is calculated as the portion
of long-term debt due in year t + 1, obtained from a firm’s financial statements in year t. All control variables are
defined in Table A1. p values, reported in parantheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***,
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Within R2 is reported for fixed
effect regressions.
(1) (2)















Inst Own −0.013 −0.149
(0.032) (0.320)




Amt Debt Issue 0.011 0.047
(0.012) (0.117)
Year FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Observations 17,188 17,188
R2 0.032 0.032
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Falsification Test – Institutional ownership
This table reports the coefficients of the OLS regression of management capital expenditure forecasts on refinancing
risk in the following specification:
Capex Guideit+1 = β0 + β1RefRiskit + β2XSit + β3RefRiskit ∗XSit + β4Xit + it,
where XS is an indicator that equals one when the capability of a firm to mitigate refinancing risk in year t is high,
and zero otherwise. In columns (1), the dependent variable is an indicator for issuing a capital expenditure forecast
in the year t+1. In columns (2), the dependent variable is the number of capital expenditure forecast. All columns
include firm fixed effects. All the independent variables are lagged by one year and decile-ranked. Refinancing Risk
is calculated as the portion of long-term debt due in year t + 1, obtained from a firm’s financial statements in year
t. All control variables are defined in Table A1.XS is HighIO, which equals one when institutional ownership of a
firm-year observation is larger than the full-sample median, and zero otherwise. p values, reported in parentheses,
are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively. Within R2 is reported for fixed effect regressions.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Capex Guide Num. Capex
RefRisk −0.037 −0.239**
(0.026 ) (0.102 )
HighIO −0.065** −0.221*
(0.030 ) (0.122 )
HighIO*RefRisk −0.012 0.010
(0.031 ) (0.124 )
Control Variables Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Observations 17,188 17,188
R2 0.0218 0.0218
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Cross-Sectional Test - Exposure to Refinancing Risk
This table reports the coefficients of the OLS regression of management capital expenditure forecasts on refinancing
risk in the following specification:
Capex Guideit+1 = β0 + β1RefRiskit + β2XSit + β3RefRiskit ∗XSit + β4Xit + it,
where XS is an indicator that equals one when a firm-year is more exposed to refinancing risk, and zero otherwise. In
columns (1), (3), and (5), the dependent variable is an indicator for issuing a capital expenditure forecast in the year
t+1. In columns (2), (4), and (6), the dependent variable is the number of capital expenditure forecast. All columns
include firm fixed effects. All the independent variables are lagged by one year and decile-ranked. Refinancing Risk is
calculated as the portion of long-term debt due in year t+1, obtained from a firm’s financial statements in year t. All
control variables are defined in Table A1. In columns (1) and (2), XS is HighLev, which equals one when the leverage
of a firm-year observation is larger than the full-sample median, and zero otherwise. In columns (3) and (4), XS is
HighV ol, which equals one when return volatility of a firm-year observation is larger than the full-sample median,
and zero otherwise. In columns (5) and (6), XS is SpecGrade, which equals one when a firm is rated speculative
grade in a year, and zero otherwise. p values, reported in parantheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the
firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Within R2 is
reported for fixed effect regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Capex Guide Num. Capex Capex Guide Num. Capex Capex Guide Num. Capex
RefRisk −0.022 −0.130* −0.012 −0.062 −0.001 −0.084
(0.019 ) (0.071 ) (0.019 ) (0.075 ) (0.026 ) (0.105 )
HighLev 0.038** 0.205**
(0.019 ) (0.080 )
RefRiskXHighlLev −0.052** −0.226**
(0.026 ) (0.105 )
HighVol 0.059*** 0.227***
(0.017 ) (0.071 )
RefRiskXHighVol −0.069*** −0.354***
(0.025 ) (0.096 )
SpecGrade 0.080*** 0.208
(0.030 ) (0.138 )
RefRiskXSpecGrade −0.125*** −0.350**
(0.038 ) (0.158 )
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,188 17,188 17,188 17,188 9,343 9,343
R2 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.023 0.023
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Cross-Sectional Test - Mitigating Refinancing Risk
This table reports the coefficients of the OLS regression of management capital expenditure forecasts on refinancing
risk in the following specification:
Capex Guideit+1 = β0 + β1RefRiskit + β2XSit + β3RefRiskit ∗XSit + β4Xit + it,
where XS is an indicator that equals one when the capability of a firm to mitigate refinancing risk in year t is high,
and zero otherwise. In columns (1) and (3), the dependent variable is an indicator for issuing a capital expenditure
forecast in the year t+1. In columns (2) and (4), the dependent variable is the number of capital expenditure
forecast. All columns include firm fixed effects. All the independent variables are lagged by one year and decile-
ranked. Refinancing Risk is calculated as the portion of long-term debt due in year t + 1, obtained from a firm’s
financial statements in year t. All control variables are defined in Table A1. In columns (1) and (2), XS is HighCash,
which equals one when the cash holding as a percentage of total asset of a firm-year observation is larger than the
full-sample median, and zero otherwise. In columns (3) and (4), XS is HighROA, which equals one when ROA of
a firm-year observation is larger than the full-sample median, and zero otherwise. p values, reported in parantheses,
are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively. Within R2 is reported for fixed effect regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Capex Guide Num. Capex Capex Guide Num. Capex
RefRisk −0.099*** −0.435*** −0.087*** −0.416***
(0.032 ) (0.137 ) (0.024 ) (0.094 )
HighCash −0.050** −0.208**
(0.020 ) (0.094 )
RefRiskXHighCash 0.067** 0.250*
(0.033 ) (0.142 )
HighROA −0.046** −0.165*
(0.023 ) (0.093 )
RefRiskXHighROA 0.057** 0.251**
(0.026 ) (0.101 )
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,188 17,188 17,188 17,188
R2 0.025 0.025 0.022 0.022
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Measure Validation: Refinancing Risk and Future Investment
This table reports the coefficients of the OLS regression of investment in period t+1 on refinancing risk in period t
in the following specification:
Investmentit+1 = β0 + β1RefRiskit + β2Xit + it, (3)
All the independent variables are measured in the year t and are decile ranked. Refinancing Risk is calculated as
the portion of long-term debt due within the next year. Investment is calculated as capital expenditure in the year
t+1 scaled by the book value of total assets in the year t. All variables are defined in Table A1. p-values, reported
in brackets, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at




























Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A1: Variable definitions




Indicator variable equal to 1 if the management issued a
capital expenditure forecast in the year t+1.
Num. of Capex Forecast I/B/E/S,
Compustat
Frequency of the number of capital expenditures forecasts
in the year t+1.
Independent Variables
RefRisk Compustat Portion of long-term debt due within the next year.
Log(Size) Compustat,
CRSP
Natural log of the market value of equity of the firm.
ROA Compustat Income before Extraordinary Operations scaled by book
value of total assets.
BTM Compustat,
CRSP
Book-to-market ratio, computed as the book value of total
assets scaled by the sum of total liabilities and the market
value of equity.
AdjReturns CRSP Market-adjusted returns, calculated as the market-adjusted
buy and hold return over the year t.
Volatility CRSP Standard deviation of daily returns over the year t.
Leverage Compustat The leverage ratio, calculated by total debt over book value
of total assets.
InstownOwn I/B/E/S Portion of total equity held by institutional investors.
Nanalyst I/B/E/S Number of analysts following the firm during year t.
Loss Compustat Equal to 1 if Income Before Extraordinary Items is negative
and 0 otherwise.
DebtIssued Compustat Equal to long-term debt issuance in year t scaled by long-
term debt in the year t-1.
CashHoldInd Compustat Equal to 1 if the cash holdings, defined as cash summed with
short-term investments scaled by book value of total assets,
is greater than the median cash holdings and 0 otherwise.
SpecGrade Compustat Equal to 1 if the S&P credit long-term rating is BB+, BB,
BB-, B+, B, B-, or CCC+, and 0 otherwise.
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